Growing concern over rights activist Mbonimpa – ‘Burundi’s Mandela’

 

Credit; Front Line Defenders

Credit; Front Line Defenders

A coalition of NGOs in Burundi today filed four complaints before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) to challenge the power of Prime Minister Pierre Nkurunziza on cases of extrajudicial killings committed between 2010 and 2012.

The extrajudicial killings of Jackson Ndikuriyo, Audace Vianney Habonarugira, Médard Ndayishimiye and Jean-Claude Ndimumahoro have never been solved by the competent authorities.

“These opponents were killed between 2010 and 2012 but to date, there is no record of these cases in the courts,” complains Pacific Nininahazwe, head of the Forum for Awareness and Development (FOCODE), one of four Burundian NGOs which filed the complaint

Human rights defenders already fear for their safety “especially in this pre-election period, characterized by intimidation against regime opponents and defenders of human rights,” said one activist in Burundi.

The activist alluded in particular to the May 15 arrest of Pierre Claver Mbonimpa (above), known as the “Burundian Mandela,” who is accused of “threatening state security” for saying that young members of the ruling party were armed and sent into eastern DRC to attend military training.

Human rights groups are expressing concern over the fate of Mbonimpa, chairman of Burundi’s Association for the Protection of Human and Prisoners’ Rights [APRODH].

Samantha Power, the US Ambassador to the United Nations, this week tweeted “#Burundihuman rights leader Pierre Mbonimpa has been jailed for 35 days—his govt continues to deny him a trial. Must be given justice ASAP.”

The mayor of Bujumbura has banned a support march staged by civil society scheduled for 16 June on the grounds that it was “insurrectionary in nature.”

“We are increasingly observing a poor understanding and misinterpretation of the law regulating public demonstrations and meetings,” said Vital Shiminimana, delegate general of the Forum for the Strengthening of the Civil Society [FORSC], responding to the ban. “We consider that some authorities are even not able to interpret the law that they are yet expected to interpret. They have a tendency to suggest that all public demonstrations are insurrections.”

APRODH is supported by the National Endowment for Democracy.

Zimbabwe: The Military vs. Democracy

In this episode of Democracy Ideas, Christopher Walker interviews Charles Mangongera about the militarization of Zimbabwe’s politics, state institutions, and economy, as well as how the military’s role may affect Zimbabwe’s prospects for democratic reform.

Mr. Charles Mangongera is a Zimbabwean human rights and governance researcher who previously served as director of policy and research at the Movement for Democratic Change. He was a Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow in residence at the International Forum for Democratic Studies from October 2013–February 2014. During his fellowship, Mr. Mangongera explored the role of the military in supplanting Zimbabwe’s democratic transition.

Watch more Democracy Ideas

Related Content

Read Charles Mangongera’s article, “A New Twilight in Zimbabwe? The Military vs. Democracy” from the April 2014 issue of the Journal of Democracy. (ProjectMUSE access is required) ::MORE

Watch video from Charles Mangongera’s fellowship presentation, “Zimbabwe’s Military and the Prospects for Democratic Reform” held on January 15, 2014.

RTWT

Reporting from Sudan’s hidden frontline

There is a war being fought in Sudan, and it’s happening almost out of sight, writes Edirin Oputu. In 2011, South Sudan became the world’s newest country as part of a peace deal to end decades of civil war. But just north of the border, in the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan, the Nuba felt left behind. A group of black African ethnic groups, they had fought on the southern side of the civil war and had little in common with their Arab neighbors. Ahmed Haroun—who is wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes—was elected governor of South Kordofan amid claims of vote rigging. Fighting broke out in the Nuba Mountains soon after.

American Ryan Boyette had travelled to Nuba with an aid agency in 2003 and settled there. His wife is Nuban. When the war broke out and agencies pulled out their staff, Boyette decided to stay. Foreign journalists were finding it increasingly difficult to get to Nuba, so Boyette founded Nuba Reports, a not-for-profit news outlet manned by Sudanese reporters [and funded by the National Endowment for Democracy], that covers the worsening humanitarian crisis.

The Columbia Journalism Review spoke to Boyette about Nuba Reports’ work documenting a conflict that is in danger of being forgotten.

What inspired Nuba Reports?

What inspired it was what brought me to Sudan originally in 2003. I had read an article about fighting that was taking place in Sudan and I was quite frustrated that I had never even heard of the fighting before I had read that article, and it had been going on for 20 years at the time. When this war started, in June 2011, I remembered that that was the reason that I came to Sudan in the first place, because I saw a huge gap in information on Sudan getting out into the international community – See more here.  

Non-Western roots of international democracy support

A striking feature of international democracy support is the connection between a country’s domestic experience with democracy and the shape of its efforts to promote democracy beyond its borders, according to Carnegie analysts Richard Youngs and Thomas Carothers.

The nature of a state’s democratic transition inevitably influences how it perceives and interacts with transition processes in other countries. In addition, the specific form of its own democratic institutions will condition how it seeks to support institutional reform in other countries.

These linkages can be a source of strength. By drawing on their country’s own experiences with a particular institutional form or political process, aid providers and democracy activists can offer usefully grounded knowledge to others grappling with similar challenges. Yet they can also prove problematic if those same actors try to export their own transitional experiences and institutional forms to disparate contexts in which different democratic solutions are needed. Western support for democracy around the world in recent decades has often embodied both the strengths and weaknesses of such internal-external linkages.

As rising democracies in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere increasingly engage in supporting democracy outside their borders, internal-external linkages in this domain take new forms. Often these countries have only relatively recently transitioned from authoritarian to democratic rule, and thus lessons from their own experience about how democratization should or should not unfold are vivid in the minds of policymakers and aid providers. ….

Thus, exploring the internal-external linkages that characterize the democracy support work of rising democracies is a useful early step in gaining a deeper appreciation of how these countries go about such work. It sheds light on the assertion made by actors in some rising democracies that their external democracy work benefits from political nuances and sensitivities that Western democracy assistance may lack.

To help illuminate this issue, experts in the recently established Carnegie Rising Democracies Network explain, on a case-by-case basis, how the experience of democratic transition influences external democracy support policies in Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, and Eastern Europe. These case studies highlight how the expanding range of actors involved in international democracy support is increasing the variety and complexity of the field overall.

BRAZIL – Oliver Stuenkel

Brazil’s democratic transition, which began in the late 1970s, was gradual, steady, and relatively peaceful. After introducing free and fair national elections in the 1980s, the government undertook market-oriented reforms and controlled inflation in the 1990s and initiated broad cash-transfer programs to reduce poverty and inequality in the 2000s….

Compared to other countries’ experiences, the Brazilian political transition was relatively drawn out. …..Democratization occurred without the explicit intervention of international actors (the IMF played a key role in the 1980s, but it was not a prodemocratic force). This fact helps explain why Brazilian foreign policy makers today remain skeptical that outside intervention of any kind can be of much help in a country’s quest to democratize, even though Brazilian political leaders agree that outsiders can at times help mediate internal conflicts. Furthermore, Brazil’s relatively smooth and bloodless transition contributed to a natural reluctance to support potentially disruptive prodemocratic movements that may lead to sudden instability and complicate civil-military relations. ….

CHILE - Claudio Fuentes

Following Chile’s transition to democracy in 1990, the country’s new leaders began developing a set of foreign policy initiatives to promote human rights abroad. Several consecutive governments promoted Chile’s proactive involvement in various regional and global institutions—the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Organization of American States, the UN Human Rights Council, the International Labor Organization, and the UN Security Council, among others. Under these governments, the Chilean armed forces also participated in international peacekeeping operations and contributed to international debates on pressing global issues, such as the UN discussion on the global responsibility to protect populations from war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. 

Chile’s domestic experience of transition helped inform this proactive approach in three ways.

First, the experience of human rights abuses committed during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet, who ruled from 1973 to 1990, pushed Chile’s new democratic authorities to make human rights protection a foreign policy priority….Second, Chile’s first generation of democratically elected policymakers played a crucial role in shaping the country’s emphasis on international human rights protection. ……Third, policy continuity also played an important role in bringing human rights to center stage. …..

These three factors—historical context, political leadership, and substantial policy continuity—were crucial in shaping Chile’s considerable engagement in advancing human rights abroad.

INDIA - Niranjan Sahoo

Once considered an unlikely candidate for democracy, India’s political journey continues to surprise international observers. With each passing election, India’s democratic credentials have grown stronger. Unsurprisingly, successful democratic governance in a large and highly diverse country like India that is plagued by mass poverty and low levels of literacy has attracted considerable academic interest and global recognition. Given India’s success, Western powers tend to see the country as a beacon of democracy in a region characterized by authoritarian regimes and failed states.

However, India remains hesitant to exercise soft power to promote democracy beyond its borders. ….The reasons why India tends to avoid including democracy support in its foreign policy stem from the country’s complex domestic politics and institutional processes. Respect for national sovereignty, a legacy of India’s anticolonial struggle and Cold War anxiety, remains an abiding principle of the country’s foreign policy. The memory of colonial subjugation and perceived virtues of nonalignment, through which India sought to position itself as the leader of the Third World, mean that Indian diplomats still tend toward nonintervention and active or interventionist democracy support finds few backers within India’s foreign policy establishment. ….

India’s dismal rights records, domestic vulnerabilities, volatile neighborhood, and rocky democratic transition have a decisive bearing on India’s foreign policy postures when it comes to values such as democracy support. Given this, India’s democracy support has mostly been in the form of extending technical assistance, capacity building, and institutional strengthening.

Yet, in recent years, there has been considerable positive movement with regard to India’s changing worldview on the role of democracy and human rights concerns in its foreign policy. The interaction of various internal and external stimuli seems to be creating an environment that is conducive to increasing democracy promotion efforts…..

INDONESIA - I Ketut Putra Erawan

The case of Indonesia exemplifies the close connection between a country’s experiences in democratization and its initiatives for external democracy support. Democracy and reform processes in Indonesia, reformasi, are perceived as new foundational national values and experiences that need to be nurtured internally and shared externally. The country’s experience of democratization strongly colors the characteristics and approach of its external democracy support initiatives in a number of ways. …..

The country’s democratic transition entailed the positive engagement and interaction of the state with civil society and other nonstate actors. The emergence of reformers from inside Indonesia’s state institutions brought not only greater legitimacy to the process of change but also the possibility of reforming the state from the inside. The engagement of civil society, media, and other nonstate activists then became crucial for sustaining the reform process.

As a result, Indonesian democracy support efforts target state, civil society, and nonstate actors. Through the Bali Democracy Forum initiative, an annual intergovernmental summit on the development of democracy in the Asia-Pacific region, Indonesia engages state actors in its neighborhood and beyond to share their experiences with and learn about democracy.

Lessons and experiences made available by international and regional actors and institutions informed Indonesia’s democratic consolidation. These external partners shared with Indonesia examples of constitution building, legal reforms, party reform, accountability mechanisms, and other institution-building challenges. International and regional actors provided support while respecting Indonesia’s internal processes and its leaders, an approach that is now reflected in the country’s emerging foreign policy.

JAPAN – Maiko Ichihara

Japan is one of the few countries that did not democratize as a result of a domestic social movement for political change. Instead, the current democratic regime was installed in the aftermath of World War II by external forces led by the United States. Due to the lack of a mass democratization movement in their own country, the Japanese remain generally opposed to supporting popular struggles for political change abroad. ….

Japan has a relatively weak democratic tradition, which is reflected in the country’s external democracy assistance policy. While the Japanese government has launched multiple policy frameworks on democracy support since the early 1990s, the country has not become a major player in the field. Between 1995 and 2012, Japan on average only allocated approximately 1 percent of its official development assistance to democracy support. ….

SOUTH AFRICA – Tjiurimo Alfredo Hengari

At the heart of South Africa’s transition was a model of tolerance and overcoming injustice. An abiding legacy of South Africa’s transition is that democratization was about “the weak” prevailing over “the strong.” That model now sits at the root of South Africa’s external projection, and this ethos continues to condition the way democracy support is woven into the broader aspects of South African foreign policy. 

A result of this legacy is a duality in South Africa’s foreign policy. During the apartheid years, South Africans saw some countries providing considerable support to the African National Congress (ANC) while other countries supported the government the ANC was fighting. As a result, some in the ANC came to associate democratic transitions with overcoming Western geostrategic neoimperialism; this has bred a reluctance to be at all interventionist in foreign policy. On the other hand, some came to see democracy support more as a civic-led movement with strong links across borders. This school of thought has pushed for more active South African democracy promotion policies built on support for civil society rather than cautious government-to-government, sovereigntist diplomacy. …..

Through the legacy of the past and the messianic tone used by the ANC as it was endorsing the transition in 1994, South Africa has elevated itself to a principled role, and it could serve as a guarantor and promoter of democratic norms and values, particularly in Africa. However, the past two decades have witnessed shortcomings in the manner in which such values have been instituted in South Africa’s external democracy support initiatives. The same features of the country’s transition that inspire others also inhibit or confuse South African democracy promotion efforts abroad. The normative bases in the country’s foreign policy, with democracy at the core, have been pursued inconsistently—albeit within the limits of what is possible and permissible in light of South Africa’s own history and the structural international political context in which the country operates.

SOUTH KOREA - Sook Jong Lee

South Korea’s democratic transition began in 1987, when the ruling authoritarian regime gave in to popular demands to reinstate direct presidential elections (an indirect system had been in place since 1972). The country’s democratization struggle drew the participation of diverse liberal segments of South Korean civil society. The involvement of white-collar workers and middle-class citizens in this struggle played a critical role in pushing the country’s ruling elites to seek a compromise for political liberalization. ….. 

The role of international organizations or foreign governments in this evolution was limited. In fact, the United States, an influential ally of South Korea, did little to press the ruling authoritarian regimes for reform at critical junctures in the process of democratization.

South Korea’s democratic transition thus grew out of successful internal modernization. It was successful only after the country had already modernized substantially.

This particular pattern explains why South Korea today supports the democratization of developing countries primarily through indirect means. Although South Korea experienced a tenacious internal struggle for political change and has evolved into a vibrant democracy, its government and nongovernmental organizations remain reluctant to support democratization struggles in other parts of the world directly. Having experienced no such intervention from the outside world during their own democratic transition, most Koreans view autonomous democratization as the most viable path.

Moreover, South Koreans tend to believe that democracy is sustainable only once a certain level of economic development has been achieved. …..

TURKEY – Senem Aydin-Düzgit

Nowhere is the linkage between a country’s domestic political system and its support for democracy and human rights beyond its borders more visible than in Turkey. In the Turkish case, this connection is best illustrated through three main processes. 

The first concerns the debates on Turkey’s potential as a democratic model in the Middle East. Turkey became active in democracy promotion after the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002 in what was widely seen as a test case of whether Islam and democracy could indeed be compatible in a modern state. ….

A second important internal-external linkage in the Turkish case pertains to the ways in which the AKP, particularly after the Arab Spring, has used the discourse of democracy promotion in the Middle East and North Africa to consolidate its power base at home….

A final key linkage between domestic political developments and Turkish democracy promotion efforts concerns the rise of neo-Islamist ideology, which became prevalent across the Turkish state and government bureaucracy with the AKP’s ascent to power. In the foreign policy realm, this ideology envisions a strong revival of Turkey’s soft power in the post-Ottoman space through the country’s cultural, historical, and religious ties to the region. It is therefore no coincidence that the volume and scope of Turkish democracy assistance (as well as its development and humanitarian assistance) in neighboring regions has increased substantially under AKP rule. The regional dimension went hand in hand with the AKP’s internal political project and was mirrored in the nature of external democracy support.

EASTERN EUROPE  - Tsveta Petrova

The Eastern European members of the EU, and especially Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Lithuania, are some of the most active emerging donors providing external democracy support. Unlike many other new democracies, Eastern European states do not negatively associate democracy promotion with an imposition of Western values. In fact, for much of Eastern Europe, the end of the Cold War was a victory for the democratic West over the regional imperial power, the Soviet Union, and its autocratic governance system. ….

As a result, democracy promotion efforts by Eastern European governments and civil society actors primarily stem from the desire to share their own transition experiences with other countries struggling to overcome authoritarian rule, and the Eastern European countries’ own democratic experiences have influenced their foreign policy priorities. Eastern European democracy promoters thus very consciously and purposefully pass on best practices and lessons learned about what worked and what failed during their own transitions. ….

Eastern European democracy promoters also prioritize work with governing elites in recipient countries. Most of this work has been primarily political, that is, building and strengthening the prodemocratic forces within recipient states rather than focusing, like many other donors do, on recipients’ socioeconomic and state development as an intermediate step toward political liberalization.

Lastly, the influence of the Eastern Europeans’ democratic experiences on these countries’ democracy promotion priorities has produced some distinctive thematic investments and policy instrument preferences. For instance, Hungary prefers to implement democracy assistance projects with the consent of the host government and often emphasizes human and especially minority rights questions. Czech diplomats, on the other hand, strongly believe in the power of “naming and shaming” oppressive regimes at the international level. And Estonia has invested in sharing its distinctive e-governance expertise in the realms of information policy and transparency with regional partners. In each case, these thematic priorities reflect aspects central to the country’s own democratic transition.

CONCLUSIONS – Richard Youngs and Thomas Carothers

The group of states included here as rising democracies went through different processes of transition. …..Each of these countries draws on the distinct features of its own transition to inform the way in which and the extent to which its supports democracy externally. This internal-external link can be purposive or more instinctive. That is, in some cases these countries seek to share their own transition experiences directly through democracy initiatives that they fund in other countries. In other cases, they simply tend to believe that the nature of their own transition represents the best way for political change to occur. Central and Eastern European states often foster civic activism as something positive, for example, while for Brazil elite-led change is seen as more desirable. 

These types of internal-external links can be seen as both advantageous and problematic. Rising democracies make a valuable contribution to democratization by sharing their own distinctive experiences. They can add much useful experience that is not so readily available to Western democracy promoters. Arguably, however, there is not sufficient recognition on the part of rising democracies that their own models of change might not be the most appropriate for some other societies. Rising democracies struggle to detach from their own transition experiences and design their external support from an understanding of the local desires and particularities of the countries in which they operate.

In addition, as with established Western democracies, at times these countries operate from myths about their own transitions that underplay complexities and can be unhelpful if projected onto other states. As they fine-tune their democracy support, these rising democracies grapple with the same difficulty that established Western democracies have long faced: they benefit in some ways from the richness of their internal experiences, but they are simultaneously hindered in other ways by the local specificities of their own experiences and models.

RTWT

Nigeria’s youth key to countering Boko Haram

nigeria girls

In the shadow of Boko Haram‘s kidnapping of more than 200 schoolgirls, bombings on 20 and 24 May have thrown Jos – a city in the middle belt of Nigeria – into the spotlight, notes Janet Adama, the West Africa program director at Conciliation Resources.

Although the attacks did not discriminate between Muslim and Christian, or Fulani and Berom (the main ethnic groups in Jos), there are growing fears of increased sectarian tensions and youth gang violence, she writes for The Guardian. These fears are not unfounded – over the past decade, Jos has experienced an enduring cycle of violence stemming from disputes over land, resources and political power that has exploited sectarian and ethnic differences. Since 2001, when major riots first erupted in Jos, at least 4,000 (and possibly as many as 7,000) people have been killed in the city.

Jos’ young people are often seen as the main aggressors when conflict escalates. The association of political, religious and ethnic conflict with criminal violence, drugs and gang culture, has seen many point to high youth unemployment as a key cause of violence.

Over the past year, Conciliation Resources, a UK-based INGO, and the Centre for Peace Advancement in Nigeria (CEPAN) have been working with Youth Platforms for Peace, a project funded by the National Endowment for Democracy, to transform young people from perceived aggressors to facilitators of peace.

The project is led by youth ambassadors, who map gang centres in their communities, as well as recruit youth participants for the Youth Platforms for Peace. Through this process, the youth ambassadors gain a greater understanding of the root causes of conflict in their community, and an appreciation of what is needed to build peace. …..The platforms seek to rebuild damaged relationships between youth and other members of the community. Discussions are hosted with women’s groups and elders, who feel most threatened by youth gangs.

Looking forward, conflict in Jos will be deeply affected by how the Nigerian government and international community decide to respond to Boko Haram.

Janet Adama is the West Africa program director at Conciliation Resources. Follow @CRbuildpeace on Twitter.

RTWT