Is kneejerk opposition to coups misplaced?

egypt sisiIs kneejerk opposition to military coups misplaced?  We can all agree that coups overthrowing democratic governments are never good, but what about authoritarian ones? asks Slate analyst Joshua Keating:

The economist Paul Collier has made that argument, suggesting that “the very forces that sanctimony comfortably condemns can sometimes be the most effective ally of democracy.” After all, whether or not a dictator survives often depends more on the support of those around him than the support of citizens. 2014 also marks the 40th anniversary of Portugal’s “Carnation Revolution” – probably history’s most famous “good coup” ….

A recent paper by political scientists Clayton L. Thyne and Jonathan M. Powell in the journal Foreign Policy Analysis examines the relationship between coups and democracy in the context of the Arab Spring., where the behavior of the military was often the deciding factor. As they note, “loyal militaries have allowed the governments in Bahrain and Syria remain intact, regimes in Tunisia and Egypt fell after military defections, and military splits led to prolonged fighting in Libya and Yemen.” In general, coups have been much more likely to lead to a return to elected government since the Cold War. Thyne and Powell argue this is in line with the incentives juntas face after taking power. …

The authors don’t go as far as to suggest supporting coups against authoritarian governments, but they say the U.S. and other foreign powers should focus more on “precoup levels of democracy when deciding how to respond to coup attempts.”

In general though, it would probably be wise for the U.S. to maintain a general bias against supporting coups,” Keating suggests. “And even when coups lead back to democracy, countries tend not to have just one. As we saw in Turkey and Thailand throughout the 20th century and Egypt more recently, countries can become trapped in coup cycles.”


Non-Western roots of international democracy support

A striking feature of international democracy support is the connection between a country’s domestic experience with democracy and the shape of its efforts to promote democracy beyond its borders, according to Carnegie analysts Richard Youngs and Thomas Carothers.

The nature of a state’s democratic transition inevitably influences how it perceives and interacts with transition processes in other countries. In addition, the specific form of its own democratic institutions will condition how it seeks to support institutional reform in other countries.

These linkages can be a source of strength. By drawing on their country’s own experiences with a particular institutional form or political process, aid providers and democracy activists can offer usefully grounded knowledge to others grappling with similar challenges. Yet they can also prove problematic if those same actors try to export their own transitional experiences and institutional forms to disparate contexts in which different democratic solutions are needed. Western support for democracy around the world in recent decades has often embodied both the strengths and weaknesses of such internal-external linkages.

As rising democracies in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere increasingly engage in supporting democracy outside their borders, internal-external linkages in this domain take new forms. Often these countries have only relatively recently transitioned from authoritarian to democratic rule, and thus lessons from their own experience about how democratization should or should not unfold are vivid in the minds of policymakers and aid providers. ….

Thus, exploring the internal-external linkages that characterize the democracy support work of rising democracies is a useful early step in gaining a deeper appreciation of how these countries go about such work. It sheds light on the assertion made by actors in some rising democracies that their external democracy work benefits from political nuances and sensitivities that Western democracy assistance may lack.

To help illuminate this issue, experts in the recently established Carnegie Rising Democracies Network explain, on a case-by-case basis, how the experience of democratic transition influences external democracy support policies in Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, and Eastern Europe. These case studies highlight how the expanding range of actors involved in international democracy support is increasing the variety and complexity of the field overall.

BRAZIL – Oliver Stuenkel

Brazil’s democratic transition, which began in the late 1970s, was gradual, steady, and relatively peaceful. After introducing free and fair national elections in the 1980s, the government undertook market-oriented reforms and controlled inflation in the 1990s and initiated broad cash-transfer programs to reduce poverty and inequality in the 2000s….

Compared to other countries’ experiences, the Brazilian political transition was relatively drawn out. …..Democratization occurred without the explicit intervention of international actors (the IMF played a key role in the 1980s, but it was not a prodemocratic force). This fact helps explain why Brazilian foreign policy makers today remain skeptical that outside intervention of any kind can be of much help in a country’s quest to democratize, even though Brazilian political leaders agree that outsiders can at times help mediate internal conflicts. Furthermore, Brazil’s relatively smooth and bloodless transition contributed to a natural reluctance to support potentially disruptive prodemocratic movements that may lead to sudden instability and complicate civil-military relations. ….

CHILE - Claudio Fuentes

Following Chile’s transition to democracy in 1990, the country’s new leaders began developing a set of foreign policy initiatives to promote human rights abroad. Several consecutive governments promoted Chile’s proactive involvement in various regional and global institutions—the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Organization of American States, the UN Human Rights Council, the International Labor Organization, and the UN Security Council, among others. Under these governments, the Chilean armed forces also participated in international peacekeeping operations and contributed to international debates on pressing global issues, such as the UN discussion on the global responsibility to protect populations from war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. 

Chile’s domestic experience of transition helped inform this proactive approach in three ways.

First, the experience of human rights abuses committed during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet, who ruled from 1973 to 1990, pushed Chile’s new democratic authorities to make human rights protection a foreign policy priority….Second, Chile’s first generation of democratically elected policymakers played a crucial role in shaping the country’s emphasis on international human rights protection. ……Third, policy continuity also played an important role in bringing human rights to center stage. …..

These three factors—historical context, political leadership, and substantial policy continuity—were crucial in shaping Chile’s considerable engagement in advancing human rights abroad.

INDIA - Niranjan Sahoo

Once considered an unlikely candidate for democracy, India’s political journey continues to surprise international observers. With each passing election, India’s democratic credentials have grown stronger. Unsurprisingly, successful democratic governance in a large and highly diverse country like India that is plagued by mass poverty and low levels of literacy has attracted considerable academic interest and global recognition. Given India’s success, Western powers tend to see the country as a beacon of democracy in a region characterized by authoritarian regimes and failed states.

However, India remains hesitant to exercise soft power to promote democracy beyond its borders. ….The reasons why India tends to avoid including democracy support in its foreign policy stem from the country’s complex domestic politics and institutional processes. Respect for national sovereignty, a legacy of India’s anticolonial struggle and Cold War anxiety, remains an abiding principle of the country’s foreign policy. The memory of colonial subjugation and perceived virtues of nonalignment, through which India sought to position itself as the leader of the Third World, mean that Indian diplomats still tend toward nonintervention and active or interventionist democracy support finds few backers within India’s foreign policy establishment. ….

India’s dismal rights records, domestic vulnerabilities, volatile neighborhood, and rocky democratic transition have a decisive bearing on India’s foreign policy postures when it comes to values such as democracy support. Given this, India’s democracy support has mostly been in the form of extending technical assistance, capacity building, and institutional strengthening.

Yet, in recent years, there has been considerable positive movement with regard to India’s changing worldview on the role of democracy and human rights concerns in its foreign policy. The interaction of various internal and external stimuli seems to be creating an environment that is conducive to increasing democracy promotion efforts…..

INDONESIA - I Ketut Putra Erawan

The case of Indonesia exemplifies the close connection between a country’s experiences in democratization and its initiatives for external democracy support. Democracy and reform processes in Indonesia, reformasi, are perceived as new foundational national values and experiences that need to be nurtured internally and shared externally. The country’s experience of democratization strongly colors the characteristics and approach of its external democracy support initiatives in a number of ways. …..

The country’s democratic transition entailed the positive engagement and interaction of the state with civil society and other nonstate actors. The emergence of reformers from inside Indonesia’s state institutions brought not only greater legitimacy to the process of change but also the possibility of reforming the state from the inside. The engagement of civil society, media, and other nonstate activists then became crucial for sustaining the reform process.

As a result, Indonesian democracy support efforts target state, civil society, and nonstate actors. Through the Bali Democracy Forum initiative, an annual intergovernmental summit on the development of democracy in the Asia-Pacific region, Indonesia engages state actors in its neighborhood and beyond to share their experiences with and learn about democracy.

Lessons and experiences made available by international and regional actors and institutions informed Indonesia’s democratic consolidation. These external partners shared with Indonesia examples of constitution building, legal reforms, party reform, accountability mechanisms, and other institution-building challenges. International and regional actors provided support while respecting Indonesia’s internal processes and its leaders, an approach that is now reflected in the country’s emerging foreign policy.

JAPAN – Maiko Ichihara

Japan is one of the few countries that did not democratize as a result of a domestic social movement for political change. Instead, the current democratic regime was installed in the aftermath of World War II by external forces led by the United States. Due to the lack of a mass democratization movement in their own country, the Japanese remain generally opposed to supporting popular struggles for political change abroad. ….

Japan has a relatively weak democratic tradition, which is reflected in the country’s external democracy assistance policy. While the Japanese government has launched multiple policy frameworks on democracy support since the early 1990s, the country has not become a major player in the field. Between 1995 and 2012, Japan on average only allocated approximately 1 percent of its official development assistance to democracy support. ….

SOUTH AFRICA – Tjiurimo Alfredo Hengari

At the heart of South Africa’s transition was a model of tolerance and overcoming injustice. An abiding legacy of South Africa’s transition is that democratization was about “the weak” prevailing over “the strong.” That model now sits at the root of South Africa’s external projection, and this ethos continues to condition the way democracy support is woven into the broader aspects of South African foreign policy. 

A result of this legacy is a duality in South Africa’s foreign policy. During the apartheid years, South Africans saw some countries providing considerable support to the African National Congress (ANC) while other countries supported the government the ANC was fighting. As a result, some in the ANC came to associate democratic transitions with overcoming Western geostrategic neoimperialism; this has bred a reluctance to be at all interventionist in foreign policy. On the other hand, some came to see democracy support more as a civic-led movement with strong links across borders. This school of thought has pushed for more active South African democracy promotion policies built on support for civil society rather than cautious government-to-government, sovereigntist diplomacy. …..

Through the legacy of the past and the messianic tone used by the ANC as it was endorsing the transition in 1994, South Africa has elevated itself to a principled role, and it could serve as a guarantor and promoter of democratic norms and values, particularly in Africa. However, the past two decades have witnessed shortcomings in the manner in which such values have been instituted in South Africa’s external democracy support initiatives. The same features of the country’s transition that inspire others also inhibit or confuse South African democracy promotion efforts abroad. The normative bases in the country’s foreign policy, with democracy at the core, have been pursued inconsistently—albeit within the limits of what is possible and permissible in light of South Africa’s own history and the structural international political context in which the country operates.

SOUTH KOREA - Sook Jong Lee

South Korea’s democratic transition began in 1987, when the ruling authoritarian regime gave in to popular demands to reinstate direct presidential elections (an indirect system had been in place since 1972). The country’s democratization struggle drew the participation of diverse liberal segments of South Korean civil society. The involvement of white-collar workers and middle-class citizens in this struggle played a critical role in pushing the country’s ruling elites to seek a compromise for political liberalization. ….. 

The role of international organizations or foreign governments in this evolution was limited. In fact, the United States, an influential ally of South Korea, did little to press the ruling authoritarian regimes for reform at critical junctures in the process of democratization.

South Korea’s democratic transition thus grew out of successful internal modernization. It was successful only after the country had already modernized substantially.

This particular pattern explains why South Korea today supports the democratization of developing countries primarily through indirect means. Although South Korea experienced a tenacious internal struggle for political change and has evolved into a vibrant democracy, its government and nongovernmental organizations remain reluctant to support democratization struggles in other parts of the world directly. Having experienced no such intervention from the outside world during their own democratic transition, most Koreans view autonomous democratization as the most viable path.

Moreover, South Koreans tend to believe that democracy is sustainable only once a certain level of economic development has been achieved. …..

TURKEY – Senem Aydin-Düzgit

Nowhere is the linkage between a country’s domestic political system and its support for democracy and human rights beyond its borders more visible than in Turkey. In the Turkish case, this connection is best illustrated through three main processes. 

The first concerns the debates on Turkey’s potential as a democratic model in the Middle East. Turkey became active in democracy promotion after the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002 in what was widely seen as a test case of whether Islam and democracy could indeed be compatible in a modern state. ….

A second important internal-external linkage in the Turkish case pertains to the ways in which the AKP, particularly after the Arab Spring, has used the discourse of democracy promotion in the Middle East and North Africa to consolidate its power base at home….

A final key linkage between domestic political developments and Turkish democracy promotion efforts concerns the rise of neo-Islamist ideology, which became prevalent across the Turkish state and government bureaucracy with the AKP’s ascent to power. In the foreign policy realm, this ideology envisions a strong revival of Turkey’s soft power in the post-Ottoman space through the country’s cultural, historical, and religious ties to the region. It is therefore no coincidence that the volume and scope of Turkish democracy assistance (as well as its development and humanitarian assistance) in neighboring regions has increased substantially under AKP rule. The regional dimension went hand in hand with the AKP’s internal political project and was mirrored in the nature of external democracy support.

EASTERN EUROPE  - Tsveta Petrova

The Eastern European members of the EU, and especially Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Lithuania, are some of the most active emerging donors providing external democracy support. Unlike many other new democracies, Eastern European states do not negatively associate democracy promotion with an imposition of Western values. In fact, for much of Eastern Europe, the end of the Cold War was a victory for the democratic West over the regional imperial power, the Soviet Union, and its autocratic governance system. ….

As a result, democracy promotion efforts by Eastern European governments and civil society actors primarily stem from the desire to share their own transition experiences with other countries struggling to overcome authoritarian rule, and the Eastern European countries’ own democratic experiences have influenced their foreign policy priorities. Eastern European democracy promoters thus very consciously and purposefully pass on best practices and lessons learned about what worked and what failed during their own transitions. ….

Eastern European democracy promoters also prioritize work with governing elites in recipient countries. Most of this work has been primarily political, that is, building and strengthening the prodemocratic forces within recipient states rather than focusing, like many other donors do, on recipients’ socioeconomic and state development as an intermediate step toward political liberalization.

Lastly, the influence of the Eastern Europeans’ democratic experiences on these countries’ democracy promotion priorities has produced some distinctive thematic investments and policy instrument preferences. For instance, Hungary prefers to implement democracy assistance projects with the consent of the host government and often emphasizes human and especially minority rights questions. Czech diplomats, on the other hand, strongly believe in the power of “naming and shaming” oppressive regimes at the international level. And Estonia has invested in sharing its distinctive e-governance expertise in the realms of information policy and transparency with regional partners. In each case, these thematic priorities reflect aspects central to the country’s own democratic transition.

CONCLUSIONS – Richard Youngs and Thomas Carothers

The group of states included here as rising democracies went through different processes of transition. …..Each of these countries draws on the distinct features of its own transition to inform the way in which and the extent to which its supports democracy externally. This internal-external link can be purposive or more instinctive. That is, in some cases these countries seek to share their own transition experiences directly through democracy initiatives that they fund in other countries. In other cases, they simply tend to believe that the nature of their own transition represents the best way for political change to occur. Central and Eastern European states often foster civic activism as something positive, for example, while for Brazil elite-led change is seen as more desirable. 

These types of internal-external links can be seen as both advantageous and problematic. Rising democracies make a valuable contribution to democratization by sharing their own distinctive experiences. They can add much useful experience that is not so readily available to Western democracy promoters. Arguably, however, there is not sufficient recognition on the part of rising democracies that their own models of change might not be the most appropriate for some other societies. Rising democracies struggle to detach from their own transition experiences and design their external support from an understanding of the local desires and particularities of the countries in which they operate.

In addition, as with established Western democracies, at times these countries operate from myths about their own transitions that underplay complexities and can be unhelpful if projected onto other states. As they fine-tune their democracy support, these rising democracies grapple with the same difficulty that established Western democracies have long faced: they benefit in some ways from the richness of their internal experiences, but they are simultaneously hindered in other ways by the local specificities of their own experiences and models.


Despite ‘failed autocrat’, Turkey’s democracy still on track

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was once the darling of the international community, but no more, says MIT analyst Daren Acemoglu. But Erdogan’s achievements are now shadowed by his undeniable lurch toward autocracy, he writes for Foreign Affairs.

Turkey is in the middle of a difficult process of institutional rebalancing, in which key political and social institutions have been shifting their allegiances away from the military and the large urban-based economic interests that have long dominated Turkish politics, notes Acemoglu, co-author of Why Nations Fail:

Erdogan’s drift from democracy is a lamentable, but almost predictable, stage of Turkey’s democratic transition. If Turkey is to eventually become a democracy, there is no way to avoid the occasionally painful process of making the country’s institutions more inclusive — a process that the country has shown no signs of abandoning.

Despite creeping authoritarianism and polarization in Turkish politics, one shouldn’t despair. From a democratic perspective, things were worse under the Kemalist elite (especially after the 1980 military coup), when Turkish society was largely depoliticized. …This is not to suggest that the recent slide in Turkish governance should be viewed through rose-colored glasses. The AKP continues to repress any opposition and will surely try to gag the Constitutional Court. But the party’s efforts to monopolize power should not surprise in historical context. More than 50 years on, the process of building inclusive political institutions in many postcolonial societies is still ongoing. And it took France more than 80 years to build the Third Republic after the collapse of the monarchy in 1789.

“Institutional rebalancing was never going to be a painless, easy process,” Acemoglu notes:

For the AKP to eventually fail in its attempts to monopolize power, ordinary people and civil society will have to protest loudly. Politics has long been an elite sport in Turkey, and the elite — whether military, bureaucratic, big business, or the AKP — have looked after their own interests, not the people’s. This will change only when politics encompasses a broader segment of society.


Turkey’s Erdogan lurches toward authoritarianism: turns on Gulenists’ ‘parallel state’

After more than a decade in which Recep Tayyip Erdogan has served as Turkey’s prime minister, the scent of change is in the air, writes FT analyst Daniel Dombey:

There is no indication that the man who dominates the country’s politics is considering leaving the scene. Rather, he is all but universally expected to seek a still more exalted position: as the country’s president in the first public elections to the post, now little more than three months away. The question is whether the historic vote will herald a more democratic system – with voters choosing their head of state – or a shift towards greater centralisation of power at a time when Turkey is already facing criticism for mounting authoritarianism.

The question now facing Turkey is whether Mr Erdogan will continue his steady accumulation of power and keep the country on its current political and economic path, Dombey adds in an FT Special Report on Turkey:

His supporters say he has little option in the face of an alleged conspiracy by the movement of Fethullah Gulen, an ally-turned-foe with followers throughout Turkish institutions. The prime minister blames Mr Gulen for the corruption probe, which he depicts as an anti-government plot.

“Call Erdogan an autocrat and then you don’t need to talk about coup attempts, illegal wiretappings, parallel structures, shadowy connections, espionage, and the misuse of judicial powers,” wrote Ibrahim Kalin, one of the prime minister’s top advisers, in a recent column.

“Calling Erdogan a dictator is an insult to Turkish democracy and the Turkish people. But nobody cares; this is the new fashion and it sells.”

Such protestations have not convinced everybody. In a speech before a glowering Mr Erdogan last month, Hasim Kilic, the head of the country’s constitutional court, declared that current trends would “bring about the end of the state of law”.

Erdogan turns on Gulenists’ ‘parallel state’

In December, weighed down by a series of investigations and leaked documents packed with evidence of alleged government graft, the thin thread by which their relationship hung snapped, Piotr Zalewski adds:

Mr Erdogan, rather than focusing on the accusations, has zeroed in on the bureaucratic faction that helped expose them. The allegations, he has claimed, amount to nothing less than a “judicial coup” staged by Mr Gulen’s followers in the police and judiciary or, as Mr Erdogan calls them, Turkey’s “parallel state”.

Mustafa Yesil, a confidant of Mr Gulen, says that if the investigation into those responsible for the leaks stays within the law, “we have little to worry about”. If it goes beyond that, “it’s not only a problem for us, but for anyone opposed to the prime minister”. A sweeping crackdown might force the cemaat, already known for its opacity, deeper into its shell.

“You can’t forget that civil society groups exist within the framework provided by the state,” says Mr Yesil. “If you don’t give them the freedom to operate, they can’t be transparent. Why do some groups go underground? Because they can’t find the legal basis, the freedom to express themselves.”….

To Ilhan Cihaner, a deputy from the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), the crackdown may have more bark than bite. Rather than all-out war, he says, Mr Erdogan is likely to opt for a limited strike. “If he wanted to act as bravely as he suggests, he would have done so already.”

Mr Cihaner, who as a regional chief prosecutor investigated the Gulen network, recalls the prime minister and the cemaat working side by side for years. The movement supplied the government with bureaucratic manpower. Mr Erdogan opened doors for its businessmen. Through a number of controversial mass trials, the two groups joined forces to bring Turkey’s mettlesome army to heel.

Even if their alliance has crumbled, both sides have too much to fear from a real fight to the finish, he says.

“One knows all about the thievery and the corruption; the other knows about all the fictitious trials, the plots and the traps,” Mr Cihaner says. “Because they were in it together.”

Foreign image and influence tarnished

The story of Turkey in the decade after Erdogan came to power in 2002 was not just of serial electoral triumph by neo-Islamists in an ostensibly vibrant democracy – alongside a dynamic economy growing at near Chinese rates – but of the re-emergence of a confident and admired regional power, writes analyst David Gardner:

But Turkey’s reputation was so bound up with Mr Erdogan that, just as he has been tarnished by charges of authoritarian behaviour, so have the country’s image and influence.  Turkey’s place in the world – as a member of Nato, a candidate member of the EU, and a compass for Arab neighbours undergoing the upheavals of the last three years – is not as assured as it seemed.

Recent curbs on social media are a means for the government to manipulate the population by controlling access to information, says Sean Gallagher, news editor of Index on Censorship, a non-governmental organisation that promotes and defends freedom of expression.

“It’s clear the recent crackdown on social media was motivated by political considerations around the elections. While Turkey’s record on censorship has never been stellar, Erdogan and his government are plumbing new depths,” he tells the FT:

Aidan White, director of the Ethical Journalism Network, blames Ankara’s relationship with current media owners – a previous generation of which exerted unhealthy influence on a succession of coalition governments – for “a crisis in Turkish journalism”.

Mr White says: “There is much evidence of internal censorship and deliberate bias in favour of the government to help the big companies that own media outlets get access to lucrative state contracts.”

According to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), Turkey last year jailed 40 journalists, more than any other country, including China and Iran, for the second year in a row. Last month, it released eight journalists with charges pending, a welcome development according to the CPJ.

Undeterred, a handful of media professionals are fighting to protect free speech. Platform for Independent Journalism P24 for example operates a website promising unbiased reporting, as well as organising workshops to explore and help solve Turkey’s media problems. “The polarisation of media which address only [a particular] constituency led to the establishment of P24 by those who believe that no idea or belief could be more valuable than true journalism,” explains P24 founder, Dogan Akin.

He says that only a financially sustainable model for news organisations will secure independent coverage. This, in turn, can be achieved only over time, and will require journalists to shed their ideological baggage.

P24 is supported by the National Endowment for Democracy, the Washington-based democracy assistance group. 

Turkey’s Erdogan presses US to extradite rival Gulen

erdogan-150x150Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has made his most explicit call yet for the US to extradite or expel Fethullah Gulen, a Pennsylvania-based preacher who has become his bitterest foe, the FT’s Daniel Dombey reports from Istanbul:

In an interview with Charlie Rose, the US broadcaster, Erdogan said he expected the US, as a strategic partner, to hand over Gulen, who has followers throughout Turkish state institutions and who the prime minister accuses of mounting a coup against the government in the form of a corruption investigation….“These elements, which threaten the national security of Turkey, cannot be accepted in other countries,” Erdogan said. “What they do here to us, they might do against their hosts.” Of Gulenists in Turkey itself he said: “They too will now see what justice means. They have already started leaving Turkey, because they know what’s going to happen to them.”

No case

gulen“Since there is no current case against (Gulen, right), extraditing him would not comply with international legal principles. The comments about extradition appear to (be) for domestic politics,” said Tercan Ali Basturk, secretary general of the Journalists and Writers Foundation, a Gulen-affiliated group in Istanbul.

Erdogan accuses Gulen of contriving criminal allegations that his son and the children of three ministers were involved in a corruption scandal and took billions of dollars of bribes. He also accuses Gulen’s movement of bugging thousands of phones and leaking audio recordings, which the cleric has denied. Turkish officials have said an investigation is underway.

“If there is due process, we have nothing to fear because we haven’t done anything constituting a crime,” Basturk told Reuters. “If there is no due process, everyone should be afraid as it means anyone who doesn’t think like Erdogan is at risk.”

It’s no longer the case that Turkey’s primary political fault line lies between secularists and the religious right, says Andrew Finkel, the author of “Turkey: What Everyone Needs to Know,” and a former Reagan-Fascell fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy.

Erdogan’s AK party and the Gulenists were once close allies, but at the ideological level, the most important divergence is the two sides’ conflicting approach to Islam, writes Omer Taspinar, a Brookings Institution analyst:

The AKP is not a classical Islamist party, but it does come from a “political Islam” tradition. The predecessor of the AKP was the Welfare Party (RP), under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan. The ideological tradition of Erbakan was known as the “Milli Görüş” (National View) movement, which followed the precepts of classical political Islam, in the footsteps of Arab Islamist theorists like Sayyid Qutb and Hassan al-Banna in Egypt. Milli Görüş stems from the Muslim Brotherhood tradition. The Muslim Brotherhood is a “political Islam”-oriented movement that wants to come to power in order to change the governing system. It prioritizes the brotherhood of the “umma” in the classical Islamic sense, as a universal community of believers. The concept of a nation-state is rejected by the Muslim Brotherhood because it is seen as divisive and tribalist, in addition to being a relatively modern Western invention.