Reforming Egypt’s military – obstacles and opportunities

Speculation over a potential military intervention in Egypt’s current conflict provides a timely reminder that security sector reform is prerequisite of genuine democratization. Drawing on months of interviews with police, army, and intelligence officers, Omar Ashour casts new light on the political dynamics of the process.

Successful democratic transitions hinge on the establishment of effective civilian control of the armed forces and internal security institutions. The transformation of these institutions from instruments of brutal repression and regime protection to professional, regulated, national services – security sector reform (SSR) – is at the very center of this effort. In Egypt, as in other transitioning Arab states and prior cases of democratization, SSR is an acutely political process affected by an array of different actors and dynamics. In a contested and unstable post-revolutionary political sphere, the reform of Egypt’s security sector requires urgent attention.

Egypt’s revolution of January 2011 was sparked by the brutality of deposed president Hosni Mubarak’s police and security forces. The most notorious and feared divisions of this security apparatus, State Security Investigations (SSI) and the Central Security Forces (CSF), quickly became the target of revolutionary actors across the political spectrum. The SSI’s longstanding record of unlawful detentions, disappearances, and systematic torture was well known; its “Human Rights Unit” was tasked not with protecting rights, but monitoring and repressing rights activists. The CSF, meanwhile, was seen as the armed enforcer of the regime’s will – stuffing ballot boxes or quelling demonstrations as needed.

The cause of overhauling these institutions to ensure effective governance, oversight, and accountability has been taken up by a range of stakeholders since the revolution, with varying degrees of success. Civil society actors have taken the lead, and one promising project is the National Initiative to Rebuild the Police Force (NIRP). The emergence within the police force of a cadre of reformist officers is also encouraging and may help shift the balance of power within the Ministry of Interior. These officers have established reformist organizations, such as the General Coalition of Police Officers and Officers But Honorable, and begun to push for SSR themselves. The prospects for implementing these civil society and internal initiatives, however, remain uncertain; they focus on admirable ends but are less clear on the means of implementation. They also have to reckon with strong elements within the Ministry of Interior – “al-Adly’s men” (in reference to Mubarak’s longstanding minister) – who remain firmly opposed to reform.

Government-led security sector reform initiatives have proved similarly problematic. After his appointment as minister of interior in March 2011, Mansour Issawi sacked hundreds of generals and disbanded the SSI. However, many have criticized his reforms as cosmetic – the new National Security Apparatus continues many of the SSI’s practices, and officers’ past abuses remain largely unpunished. From January 2012, a new parliament dominated by former (largely Islamist) dissidents – themselves victims of police brutality – took up the cause of SSR and approved amendments to the Law on the Organization of the Police. Again, though, there were criticisms of the reforms as insufficiently comprehensive, and the work of the parliament was in any case cut short when the body was disbanded by a Constitutional Court ruling.

The major obstacle to successful security sector reform in Egypt’s transition, however, has been the role played by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, an inherently SSR-averse body which retained executive powers until June 2012. Unlike in Tunisia and Libya, pro-revolution forces in Egypt did not enjoy any real power in the immediate after math of their uprising, and the country’s first freely elected parliament had a limited mandate.

The election of President Muhammad Morsi and his bold attempt to tilt the balance of power between the civilian administration and the military establishment have dealt a significant blow to opponents of security sector reform. By reclaiming executive powers for the presidency and culling Egypt’s top military brass and security sector chiefs, he has removed major obstacles to civilian control of the armed forces and security apparatuses. Furthermore, the president’s choices of ministerial appointments will allow him to advance a pro-reform agenda in key areas through ministries that wield significant, if soft, power, such as the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Parliamentary and Legal Affairs.

The paper’s final section includes recommended steps to be taken as the newly-elected government seeks to extend civilian control of the security establishment – an initiative that will be an important test both of Morsi’s administration and of Egypt’s democratic transition.

Omar Ashour is a nonresident fellow at the Brookings Doha Center and the Director of the Middle East Graduate Studies Program at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter. He is the author of The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements.

The above extract is from From Bad Cop to Good Cop: The Challenge of Security Sector Reform in Egypt,” a paper published jointly by the Brookings Doha Center and the Program on Arab Reform at Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.

RTWT

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Brotherhood, not Morsi, directing violence in Egypt?

Egypt’s Republican Guard today ordered rival demonstrators to leave the area around the presidential palace in Cairo after seven people were killed in overnight clashes.

Muslim Brotherhood supporters of President Mohamed Morsi withdrew, but opposition groups promised further protests.

“This is not a fight for an individual, this is not a fight for President Morsi,” one supporter declared. “We are fighting for God’s law, against the secularists and liberals.”

The largely liberal and secular demonstrators were protesting the president’s recent decree to expand his prerogatives and against plans to push through an Islamist-oriented constitution.

“If this constitution passes, it will be the first Egyptian constitution that adopts a specific religious doctrine for the state,” writes Ragab Saad of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, noting that certain articles could allow for “instituting authoritarianism in the name of religion.”

Morsi’s Islamist backers yesterday attacked opposition protesters, reportedly at the instigation of a prominent Brotherhood leader.

The Brotherhood’s former Supreme Guide Mehdi Akef reportedly said that the group’s deputy leader “Khairat el-Shater is the one who gave the direct orders to the Brotherhood to descend on the palace and disperse the sit-in.”

The group’s senior leaders are “fully convinced that the felol [former regime elements] are behind the crisis and they should be beaten and kicked out of the scene,” says one of the best online/scholarly observers.

“Tuesday showed the true colors of the Brotherhood,” according to Bikya Masr:

They revealed that they can continue to lie to a population, fall back on an election victory that means very little today – if you abuse democratic power, the people have a right to rise up against you – and showed Egyptians that they have no desire for democracy… At the same time, the media propaganda coming from the Muslim Brotherhood and the Morsi government shows they have learned little about the changes that have taken hold in Egypt for the past two years.

“Egyptians will no longer accept dictatorship and authoritarianism,” it notes, suggesting that “Egyptian liberals have shown they can learn from past mistakes, evolving to once again take the mantle of change.”

“Morsi is not in control and the MB leaders are the real player” says Durham University’s Khalil Anani. “The Brotherhood’s resilient character makes it hard to expect any concessions from its leaders.

According to Reuters: Morsi has shown no sign of buckling under pressure from protesters, confident that the Islamists, who have dominated both elections since Mubarak was overthrown, can win the referendum and the parliamentary election to follow. As well as relying on his Brotherhood power base, Morsi may also draw on a popular yearning for stability and economic revival after almost two years of political turmoil.

The Brotherhood has formed a new Islamist coalition with several ultraconservative Salafist groups, which issued a statement accusing the protesters’ of “disgusting practices,” and warning that “the alert masses of the Egyptian people are capable of defending legitimacy and defending the gains of their glorious revolution.”

The alliance appears designed to smooth relations with those Salafis who have criticized the draft constitution for not imposing sharia law.

“The tensions between the Salafis and the brotherhood have important implications for the referendum on the draft constitution and the parliamentary elections that will follow,” writes analyst Mara Revkin in Foreign Policy. “It will take more than the brotherhood’s core constituency to pass the new draft constitution. Salafis and liberals will need to vote in significant numbers.”

There is growing pressure on the military — which enjoys a good relationship with Morsi — to take sides, said Robert Springborg, an expert on the Egyptian military at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif.:

At the moment, Springborg said, the military and Morsi have cemented their relationship through the draft constitution. The document enshrines the military’s autonomy to a degree that surpasses even the Mubarak days, a position the generals might be reluctant to relinquish to secular forces interested in rewriting the charter. But the more they believe that Morsi is mishandling the transition, the more incentive they may have to abandon him, Springborg said, a fact that may also put pressure on the president to try to settle the crisis.

In some sense, Springborg said, “both sides are looking to the military to decide the future of the country where they are unable as civilians to work it out between themselves.”

But another prominent observer concedes that “We don’t know what is going on the military.”

“It is going to be increasingly difficult for the military to play a political role in this very divided atmosphere because probably the military is itself polarized internally,” says Carnegie analyst Marina Ottaway.

“The military is a cross section of Egyptian society,” she observes. “They have a very large number of draftees, and a lot of the draftees are undoubtedly sympathizers of the Muslim Brotherhood, if not of the Salafis…… And probably, there are divisions in the officer corps.

The conflict between the Islamists and the seculars has become a Greek tragedy, she says.

“The two sides are not fighting with the same weapons. The Muslim Brothers are fighting in the electoral arena, not necessarily because they are more democratic but because they can win elections. So it is to their advantage to have a referendum,” Ottaway notes. “The secular opposition does not have the support of a unified organization to win elections and are using the courts in order to bolster their own power and to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from benefiting from the results of elections.”

The acute polarization and heated rhetoric is raising the prospect of further political violence, observers suggest.
“The mostly liberal and leftwing activists who led last year’s uprising against Mr Mubarak’s decades-long rule have grown alarmed at the increasingly menacing rhetoric of Mr Morsi and his allies,” writes Cairo-based analyst Heba Saleh:

Before bearded Islamist enforcers stormed the tent encampment outside the presidential palace, Essam el-Erian, a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political party, Freedom and Justice, called on supporters to take the law into their own hands and cleanse the streets of troublemakers.

The conflict is reportedly exposing differences within the Obama administration and other external actors over the appropriate response and longer term approaches to engaging the Islamist government.

“There’s a real divide in Washington right now inside the U.S. government as well as in the expert community between those who are willing to assume good intentions on the part of President Morsi and those who believe that what he has done recently proves he has no intention of carrying out a full democratic transition,” said the Atlantic Council’s Michele Dunne. “Developments in Egypt over the next few weeks might settle this argument one way or the other.”

According to a bipartisan Task Force on the Future of U.S.-Egypt Relations, U.S. policy “should be based on presenting Egyptian leaders with a set of clear choices that would give them a pathway to act as responsible national leaders rather than as religiously inspired ideologues.”

“While Washington cannot convince or compel the Islamists governing Egypt to give up their deeply held ideology, the United States can use its leverage to affect Egyptian behavior,” say Vin Weber and Gregory B. Craig who chaired the group, an initiative of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

The task force recommends that:

  • the president and congressional leaders should together inform the Egyptians about an additional “informal conditionality” on issues of “constitutional democracy and political pluralism,” i.e., that backward movement on constitutionalism or substantial violations of human rights or measures against women and religious minorities would make it politically difficult to maintain a close and mutually beneficial relationship.
  • the administration should use a portion of Egypt’s military aid — at least $100 million to start, and increasing over time — to incentivize more aggressive efforts by the Egyptian government to combat terrorism in Sinai.
  • the administration should actively engage with the broadest possible spectrum of political actors in Egypt, even if the non-Islamist opposition is currently weak and divided.
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Islamists attack labor union, Tunisia’s ‘new opposition’

Supporters of Tunisia’s ruling Islamist party yesterday violently attacked a protest by the country’s main labor federation, AFP reports:

Several dozen assailants assaulted members of the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT) who were gathered outside the union’s headquarters in Tunis to mark the 60th anniversary of the assassination of its founder, Farhat Hached. The UGTT’s secretary general, said Houcine Abassi, blamed the “enemies of democracy” for Tuesday’s violence, and denounced what he said was an unprecedented attack against his organization.

“They want to assassinate the UGTT on the day that it commemorates the assassination of Hached, who sacrificed his life for his people and his country,” Abassi told private radio station Shems FM. He said such an attack had never been witnessed before, “neither during the time of (Tunisia’s first president Habib) Bourguiba, nor of Ben Ali.”

“The Islamists, thought to belong to the League for Protection of the Revolution, blamed union leaders for inciting anti-government unrest,” the BBC reports. Carrying banners, the Islamists chanted, “UGTT, you are thieves, you want to destroy the country”.

The League, an organization “close to Ennahda that has developed a reputation for brutal violence,” was accused of beating an opposition party official to death in October.

Analysts and democracy advocates say the Islamists are exposing an inherent authoritarianism and intolerance of dissent.

“This is a message from Ennahda to stop union activism. It’s the same method used by Ben Ali,” said UGTT figure Fethi Debek. The union has called a general strike for December 13 to protest the attacks, says the Solidarity Center,* the Washington-based democracy assistance group.

In a series of protests across Tunisia’s interior, demonstrators have called for the ouster of the Ennahda-majority coalition, echoing the revolt that ignited the Arab Spring two years ago.

The labor movement “has emerged as the main bulwark to Ennahda,” says David Ottaway, a scholar at Washington’s Woodrow Wilson Center.

“The UGTT has a long history of confrontations and general strikes, and both Bourguiba and Ben Ali had showdowns requiring takeovers of its leadership,” he wrote in a recent paper. “Ennahda is not yet in a position to do this, while the union, with an extremely militant base, has been more assertive and demanding.”

President Moncef Marzouki last week acknowledged that the government had not “met the expectations of the people,” expressing concern that growing unrest could derail the country’s democratic transition.

“Tunisia today is at a crossroads,” he said. “Tunisia today has an opportunity that it must not miss to be a model because the world is watching us, and we mustn’t disappoint.”

The UGTT was instrumental in pacifying, politicizing and spreading the initially violent protests that followed the self-immolation of street vendor Muhamed Bouazizi in the interior town of Sidi Bouzid, the catalyst for the subsequent wave of unrest.

The country’s labor unions “played a critical role in sustaining the uprising and expanding it beyond the remote regions,” according to political scientist Amr Hamzawy.

Ennahda views the labor movement as a bastion of secularism with a nationwide network which enjoys a degree of popular support and legitimacy to that of the Islamists, analysts suggest.

“The tension is all the greater because the UGTT is taking the place of the opposition political parties, which are incapable of fulfilling their proper role,” says Hèla Yousfi, a senior lecturer at Paris Dauphine University.

The union has adopted a formal position to stand “alongside civil society and the Tunisian people in all their diversity, to defend not only the working masses but, above all, the republic and its institutions,” she writes, noting that it often prioritizes political issues above narrow economistic demands.

“The actions called by the UGTT to defend individual liberties and denounce the violence of small Salafist groups or the police occasionally take precedence over strikes and demonstrations over pay and conditions. The UGTT’s leaders systematically point out the historic legitimacy of their organization and warn that, in a crisis, they will not hesitate to assume a political role.”

There is evidence that organized labor “actually enjoys greater popularity than Ennahda,” writes analyst Joseph Braude:

Claiming a membership base of 850,000, its credibility with the population was born of history: it was a key base of resistance to French rule, which led to independence for the country in 1956. Since then, it has shared the challenge of unions elsewhere to aid its constituents without incurring the wrath of a dictator and his friends. But that influence has not yet translated into political power. In last year’s parliamentary elections, the UGTT made the fateful decision not to create its own party. ….Even so, labor candidates collectively won more seats than Ennahda, though not enough to block its governing coalition.

Labor’s emergence as a democratizing force goes against the grain in a region where union federations have historically been controlled by the state or ruling party, akin to communist-style “transmission belt” unions.

One of the principal reasons Tunisia is widely considered ripe for a more inclusive political system is “the existence of strong trade unions throughout the country,” said Nabila Hamza, president of the Amman-based Foundation for the Future, which promotes democratic reform across the Arab world.

“In a wider context, the regular attacks on the UGTT and the different social movements raise the question of the political elite’s attitude to Tunisia’s economic and social problems. This elite tends to label protest movements as criminal and has difficulty in focusing on economic and social issues, writes Yousfi, author of L’UGTT au cœur de la révolution tunisienne (The UGTT’s role at the heart of the Tunisian revolution, forthcoming January 2013):

The UGTT, as a force for national stability and a refuge for social movements (as its members like to call it), may, with luck, manage to set aside short-term political considerations and articulate the Tunisian people’s political demands in the form of a real economic and social project — one worthy of a revolution whose slogan was “Work, Freedom, National Dignity”. RTWT

*The Solidarity Center is one of the core institutes of the National Endowment for Democracy.

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Escape from North Korea’s gulag

North Korea’s labor camps are plainly visible, “but people do not want to see them,” wrote The Washington Post’s Fred Hiatt.

Shin Dong-hyuk was born into the North Korean gulag and miraculously escaped from the notorious Camp 14 in North Korea, where he lived or, rather, survived for 23 years.

It is “a place so brutal and horrific it’s hard to believe it exists…..part of the largest network of political prisons in the world today,” according to 60 Minutes, previewing a riveting, must-see segment:

Some 150,000 people are believed to be doing hard labor on the brink of starvation in these hidden gulags. But it’s not just those who have been accused of political crimes; it’s their entire families — grandparents, parents, and children. A practice called “three generations of punishment.”

VIEW IT HERE

The story is also told by Blaine Harden, the author of Escape from Camp 14 (above).  

Information about developments within the Hermit state is also emerging from a new generation of defectors and publicized via such outlets as Daily NK, a grantee of the National Endowment for Democracy, the Washington-based democracy assistance group.

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Egypt: as Brotherhood counter-attacks, can liberals win?

Several thousand supporters of Egypt’s President Muhammad Morsi today attacked demonstrators protesting against a power-grab by the country’s Muslim Brotherhood.

The assault came after the Brotherhood called for a counter-protest against what it described as “oppressive abuses” by opposition forces.

Mahmoud Ghozlan, a Brotherhood spokesman, was quoted on the group’s Facebook page as saying the abuses were committed by groups that “imagined they could shake legitimacy or impose their view with force”.

 “The Brotherhood’s disdain for liberals is nothing new and is, at least in part, a product of the Mubarak years, when many liberals tolerated the Mubarak regime as the lesser of two evils,” writes Shadi Hamid, an analyst at Brookings’ Doha Center:

But it runs deeper than that: Islamists generally don’t see liberals as having any natural constituency in Egypt. Moreover, they represent an ideology that is foreign to Egypt and, worse, morally subversive. To the extent that Egyptians ever support “liberals,” it’s only because they don’t want to vote for the Brotherhood, not because they’re liberal or even know what “liberalism” means.

Secular and liberal groups are concerned that the draft constitution drawn up by a panel packed with Islamists is taking the country’s transition in a profoundly illiberal direction, a trajectory unlikely to be checked by any countervailing forces or institutions.

“Unlike the Islamist-led government in Turkey, Egypt lacks the checks and balances necessary to ensure the balance of power and avoid authoritarian tendencies,” notes analyst Rula Jebreal:

In Turkey, the PKK party is restrained by the state’s secular constitution, strong military institutions, and a secular legal system. Egypt will never be a secular state, nor should it have to be. However, the Brotherhood or any other party must be held accountable by independent state institutions.

“Liberals’ problem with Morsi’s decree is not so much its authoritarian overtones,” Brookings analyst Hamid observes, “but that its authoritarianism is (or could be) in the service of an ideology — Islamism — that they view as an existential threat to Egypt.”

There is also concern about threats to freedom of expression arising from the constitution’s provisions stipulating that news media must uphold public morality and the “true nature of the Egyptian family,” and requiring government authorization to operate a TV station or a Web site.

“The protection of freedom of expression is fatally undermined by all the provisions that limit it,” said Heba Morayef, a researcher with Human Rights Watch. “On paper, they have not protected freedom of expression. It is designed to let the government limit those rights on the basis of ‘morality’ or the vague concept of ‘insult.’ ”

As the charter will be put to a referendum on December 15, Morsi no longer requires the untrammelled powers he granted himself with a recent edict, observers suggest.

“The only reason the decree still exists is to protect the Shura Council,” says Ahmed Aboul Enein, a reporter for Daily News Egypt, noting that the upper house has an Islamist supermajority of 83 percent with the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party commanding a 58 percent majority.

“Morsi and the Brotherhood know they will not be able to replicate their electoral victory in the 2011 parliamentary elections,” he writes in the Atlantic Council’s Egypt Source:

So instead, the draft constitution gives the ineffective Shura Council, elected by less than seven percent of the country’s eligible voters, full legislative authority. The proposed constitution also specifies that the current council will remain intact until a lower house of parliament  is elected. At that point, legislative authority will be transferred, and a new Shura Council will be elected within six months of the House of Representative’s first session.

“Morsi is essentially guaranteeing the Brotherhood maintains the legislative majority for the immediate time period after which the constitution passes,” Enein concludes.

 “While not foreordained, a slow drift toward illiberal majoritarianism is now distinctly possible, as is the attendant instability that is likely to ensue,” Michael Wahid Hanna, a fellow at the Century Foundation, writes on Foreign Policy.

Morsi impressed the United States and other international actors with his role in the Israel-Hamas conflict, but he should not be given a pass.

“Morsi’s pragmatism should not come as a surprise. It is a clear reflection of enduring national interests and the infeasibility of aggression towards Israel,” he argues. “Rewarding Morsi for his pragmatic approach to the recent Gaza conflict is a case of offering inducements for a policy already decided.”

Such pragmatism is unlikely to last, Hanna contends:

With an Islamist-led government now in place in Egypt, the deep-seated anti-Israel sentiments of the Muslim Brotherhood and its ideological affinity for Islamist fellow-travelers such as Hamas will reshape regional dynamics. Egypt will undoubtedly play a greater role in championing the Palestinian cause, and future Egyptian governments will abandon the anti-Hamas policies long pursued by the Mubarak regime.

“If America acquiesces anew to authoritarian behavior in Cairo, it won’t win a new stable ally; it will only further alienate the many Egyptians who find the transactional nature of U.S.-Egyptian ties repugnant,” Hanna concludes. “Even worse, it will encourage a destructive political culture that provides an unstable foundation for future relations.”

 “Islamists are Islamists for a reason. They have a distinct ideological project, even if they themselves struggle to articulate what it actually entails,” Brookings analyst Hamid observes:

The Brotherhood has already been developing something called the “Nahda Project,” a sort of dream for Islamist would-be technocrats. While some of the project’s ideas on institutional reform, economic development, and urban renewal are impressive, they shouldn’t be taken as the end point of what Islamists are trying to do. 

Egypt’s liberals have an unprecedented opportunity “to seize the momentum from the Islamists,” say two prominent analysts.

The National Salvation Front, led by progressive Hamdeen Sabahi, Nobel laureate Mohamed ElBaradei, and former Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa should forget about making the case that the Brotherhood’s draft constitution is too Islamic or conservative,” write Tarek Masoud and Wael Nawara.

“Instead, liberals need to focus on what has worked for them in the past—organizing to oppose unchecked power,” they argue. “After all, there is something deeply reminiscent of the old regime and the way it did business in Morsi’s declaration that his decisions are ‘final and binding and cannot be appealed by any way or to any entity,’ and his arrogating to himself the power to ‘take the necessary actions and measures to protect the country and the goals of the revolution.’”

The new constitution features a range of authoritarian provisions, such as limits on freedom of association.

“Egyptian workers have struggled in recent years to establish genuinely independent labor unions, and they were a driving force in the movement that brought down Mubarak. One would have expected, then, that the new constitution would reflect their aspirations,” Masoud and Nawar note:

Instead, it restricts the formation of trade unions “to only one per profession,” and contains lukewarm language on the right to strike, saying only that worker actions will be regulated by the law (opening up the possibility of restrictions). On Nov. 24, the president issued a law increasing the government’s control over the country’s largest trade union, further suggesting that the Muslim Brotherhood’s Egypt will not be friendly to organized labor.

“The liberals need to figure out what to say about the constitution to the millions of Egyptians who don’t necessarily share their fine liberal sensibilities, and then they have to make sure that they say it often and loudly enough to get voters to reject it at the polls,” they contend:

If you’ve followed the twists and turns in Egypt’s 20-month democratic odyssey—particularly the way the country’s liberals have been repeatedly outplayed by Islamists—you could be forgiven for being pessimistic about the liberals’ prospects of pulling this off. But the newfound energy in the hitherto moribund liberal camp, and the show of unity between perennially divided leaders like ElBaradei, Moussa, and Sabahi, may be evidence that the non-Islamists are finally making their way up the political learning curve. Whether they’ve learned enough to beat the Muslim Brotherhood is an open question.

RTWT

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